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THE ADEQUACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
FOR ARMS CONTROL, POST-SEPTEMBER 11
ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION

by Antonio F. Perez
Arms control was never an end in itself. Arms control and nonproliferation policy
always had as their goals increasing international security. It may be worth recalling
that, in response to having it called to his attention that he had changed his views on
a matter, Lord Keynes is widely reported to have quipped, "When the facts change,
what do you do?" Indeed, as Lord Keynes also once said, "There is no harm in sometimes being wrong-especially if one is promptly found out."'
The question for this panel is whether the sea change in strategic thinking reflected
in the arms control and nonproliferation policies of the Bush administration are based
on new facts and a better understanding of the relation between those policies and the
international environment. In keeping with the theme of this conference, we need to
explore whether long-established or emerging understandings of the role international
law plays in this area provide the best platform for assuring international security from
the risk of weapons of mass destruction. Are arms control and nonproliferation in fact
a case of delegalization, or are they simply the beginnings of a relegalization on entirely
new premises?
The current regime is largely one of multilateral institutions of a nearly legislative
character established by formal treaty and lesser quasi-legal instruments, such as the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),' the Nuclear Suppliers'
Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,4 and the Biological Weapons Convention.' Bilateral commitments-such as, for example, START6 and the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 7-argely fit into this multilateral structure through their
linkage to the denuclearization obligations of nuclear weapons states under Article VI
of the NPT, which was most recently reaffirmed, arguably even enhanced, by the Clinton
administration at the NPT Review Conference held in 2000.
The central premise of this regime as a subsystem of international law is the right,
based on sovereign equality, of all states-regardless of the character of their internal
regimes-to have access to the necessary equipment, materials, and technology. Renunciation of the right to weapons of mass destruction accordingly entails a correlative
commitment by those states that possess such capabilities to transfer materials, equipment, and technology so as not to deprive the international community as a whole of
*Professor, The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
'JOHN BARTLETr, BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 783 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1932).
2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedforsignatureJuly 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729
UNTS 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
Convention for the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, 32 ILM 800 (1993).
'United Nations Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1999, UN Doc. A/50/1027, Annex, reprinted
in 35 ILM 1439 (1996).
' Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, 11 ILM 309 (1972).
6 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-20 (1991) (entered into force Dec. 5, 1994).
'Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 UST 3435.
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the benefits of peaceful cooperation. In other words, the sovereign right of access, and
thus nonproliferation policy, is premised on a state's compliance with international
legislation rather than on the character of its regime.
The breakdown of this seamless web of commitments promises a radically different
approach, focusing instead on bilateral measures. Perhaps, as Henry Sokolski and others
now in the Bush administration have argued, it is necessary to employ a kind of discriminate nonproliferation, that is to say, distinguishing among states that would acquire weapons of mass destruction in terms of the internal character of their regimes
rather than of their compliance with international legislation.8 Why, in other words,
should the United States oppose India's possession of nuclear weapons and why should
it be satisfied with essentially an atoms for peace approach to North Korean acquisition
of sensitive nuclear technology and material?
Indeed, can the United States continue to adhere even to its NPT obligation not to
transfer nuclear weapons technology to NPT non-nuclear weapon states such as India
when the imperative of strategic discrimination dictates different approaches? In an era
when democracy challenges despotism everywhere, is the former sovereign right to
access to inherently dangerous materials, equipment, and technology now better conceived as an entitlement only for democratic states? Must national security policy be
democratized so that only states whose political processes permit the question of possession or use of weapons of mass destruction to be subject to some degree of democratic
political control may rightfully claim to participate in this dangerous trade? Should such
a principle become a legitimate ground for discrimination in unilateral national policy?
We may have no choice. Al Qaeda's origins in Saudi Arabia and Egypt suggest that
nondemocratic states may well be breeding grounds for terrorism, and the support that
Iraq and Iran have furnished international terrorism reinforces the link between the
internal character of a state and the foreign policy means it can employ over time. The
new global threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction may well compel a
focus on particulars and country-by-country policies. The U.S. administration specifically relied on this new circumstance as "the extraordinary event jeopardizing" the
United States's "supreme national interests" and thus warranting our withdrawal from
the ABM.
Yet this precedent could serve as an argument for NPT non-nuclear-weapon states to
assert that their "supreme national interests" have been compromised by the willingness
of some states to harbor terrorists capable of using weapons of mass destruction. Much
as the United States has claimed that new circumstances compel it to install a limited
missile defense capability, NPT member non-nuclear-weapons states might well conclude that they now require the capacity, through the threat or use of nuclear weapons,
to retaliate and thereby deter states from giving support to terrorists capable of using
weapons of mass destruction.
That logic no doubt extends to the acquisition of other types of retaliatory capabilities. It opens the door to dissolution of the existing multilateral arms control regime.
Moreover, the increasing risk of horizontal proliferation calls into question the trend
over the last generation toward decreasing vertical proliferation. Arguably, as the volume of surplus nuclear materials, particularly in Russia, increases (even with the best
possible effort toward physical protection and recycling through peaceful nuclear activities), the risks associated with horizontal proliferation, including that these weapons fall
into the hands of terrorists, will increase.
In sum, are we now embarked on an era of retrenchment of international legislation
in arms control and nonproliferation policy, an era of unilateral and bilateral U.S.
efforts to maximize its leverage-case by case, problem by problem, state by state? Should
8 See HENRY SOKOLSKI, BEST OF INTENTIONS: AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 110-11 (2001).
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we be? (Retrenchment might parallel a similar Bush administration move toward regional and bilateral trade policy, where avoiding multilateral negotiations facilitates the
exercise of relative U.S. power in securing deeper trade integration and the leverage
to secure better terms of trade in nonweapons-sensitive market sectors.) I raise these
questions about the continued utility of existing multilateral regimes in the spirit of
Lord Keynes, who also said, "Words ought to be a little wild, for they are the assault of
thoughts on the unthinking."' If there were ever any doubt, the death of more than
three thousand American and foreign nationals on September 11th now clearly establishes the need to think through arms control and nonproliferation policy from the
ground up, so that law follows good policy and the shackles of international law do not
prevent us from getting things right.
Let us now look at the real world gains in international security to be achieved in arms
control and nonproliferation policies as we grapple with these larger questions of legal
strategy. Department of Defense Associate Deputy General CounselJack Beard will now
address the bilateral efforts of the Bush administration to address the threat of chemical and biological weapons proliferation, particularly in the soft underbelly of Russia,
the region of greatest strategic interest today.
A NEW URGENCY

ABOUT ANTHRAX:

RECENT EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION
OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

by Jack M. Beard
The threat of biological weapons, once an obscure topic to mostAmericans, achieved
new prominence and urgency in the United States with the anthrax letter attacks that
followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A number of infections traced to
a handful of anthrax-laced letters focused unprecedented attention in America on the
danger of biological weapons (BW). Coupled with continuing reports of attempts by
terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction, this has made efforts to prevent BW
proliferation a high priority for the U.S. government.
Notwithstanding the new prominence of the BW threat, the U.S. government recently
withdrew its support of a seven-year effort to create a new protocol to improve monitoring and inspections under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).1 Concerned that the protocol's approach would compromise sensitive biological defense and
confidential business information and would do nothing to increase compliance with
the BWC, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
John Bolton, told a UN Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention that "the
United States will simply not enter into agreements that allow rogue states or others to
develop and deploy biological weapons," stating that the draft biological weapons
protocol "is dead in our view and not to be resurrected."2 The United States also sought
BARTLETT, supra note 1, at 783.
Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs), U.S. Department of Defense; Adjunct Prof-

essor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Professorial Lecturer in International Law and Institutions,
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International StudiesJohns Hopkins University. The views presented are
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
government.
'Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972,26 UST 583, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered

into force March 26, 1975) [hereinafter BWC] (there are currently 144 states that are parties to the BWG).
2
John Zarocostas, U.S. Names Five Biological Weapons States, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Nov. 19, 2001; Steven
Mufson, U.S. Says Iraq, Others PursueGerm Warfare,WASH. POST, Nov. 20,2001, atA8 (noting that Mr. Bolton

also said that "the time for 'better than nothing' protocols isover" and that "we will continue to reject flawed
texts like the BWC draft protocol, recommended to us simply because they are the product of lengthy
negotiations or arbitrary deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the United States" ).
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to focus attention on the number of BWC member countries with offensive BW programs. In response, domestic and foreign commentators strongly criticized the U.S.
position, questioning America's commitment to this and other multilateral efforts.3
Although the United States rejected the proposed BWC protocol, it continues to combat the threat posed by biological weapons by other means, including increased bilateral
efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. In a recent meeting with the
president of Russia, President Bush declared that "our highest priority is to keep terrorists
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" and that "we will strengthen our efforts
to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, materials,
and expertise."4 In this regard, there is no greater threat than that posed by the legacy
of the Soviet Union's BW program. In addition to five military microbiological facilities
under the control of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, it has been reported that as many
as forty-seven other scientific institutes and production facilities worked on biological
weapons under the cover of numerous other Soviet ministries and organizations. Many
of these only recently came to light after Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially acknowledged the existence of an offensive BW program in April 1992.'
The legacy of the Soviet BW Program, coupled with economic problems in the states
of the former Soviet Union (FSU), has posed a serious threat of proliferation of BWrelated expertise (the "brain drain" of former weapons scientists); smuggling or unauthorized transit of pathogenic agents; and export and diversion of BW-related equipment,
including dual-use technology.6 While many of the Soviet BW complexes and production
centers were located in Russia, two other former Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, also have inherited substantial portions of this deadly BW infrastructure. The Scientific Experimental and Production Base at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan has been called by
experts the Soviet Union's main facility for the manufacture of biological weapons and
was in fact "one of the largest installations ever created for this purpose."7 It was at
Stepnogorsk that research teams developed the Soviet Union's most deadly weaponsgrade anthrax agents. Other facilities in Kazakhstan, such as the Scientific Research
Agricultural Institute, developed agents harmful to livestock and plants.8 On an isolated
island named Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral Sea, the government of Uzbekistan is now confronted with the vast infrastructure that supported the Soviet Union's major open-air
BW testing range.9 In addition to being the site for testing pathogens such as tularemia,
Q-fever, brucellosis, glanders and the plague, Vozrozhdeniye is also the world's largest
anthrax burial ground."0
Bush AdministrationIrresponsible in Face of Bioweapons Threat: U.S. Kills Biological Weapons Conf., Puts U.S.
at Risk, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 7, 2001 (noting that the U.S. position "so shocked delegates" that European
Union representatives referred to the U.S. delegation as "liars"); Herve Kempf, Is US Powera Forcefor Good
in the World? MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WKLY., Jan. 23, 2002, at 29 (arguing that U.S. actions such as the
opposition to the biological weapons protocol show that "the Americans have adopted a deliberately unilateral stance").
4
President's News Conference with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, PUBLIC PAPERS OFTHE PRESIDENTS,
vol. 37, No. 46, Nov. 19, 2001, at 1.
'Jonathan B. Tucker, BioweaponsfromRussia:Stemming theFlow,ISSUES IN SC. & TECH. ONLINE, Spring 1999,
at 1-2, availableat <http://www.nap.edu/issues>.
6 Id. at 1.
7 Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva et al., FormerSoviet BiologicalWeapons Facilitiesin Kazakhstan: Past, Present,Future,
in 8 OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 1, at 8 (Monterey Inst., Center for Nonproliferation Stud.,June 1999). The BW
facilities at Stepnogorsk occupied two square kilometers and consisted of 25 buildings; they were capable
of producing up to 300 metric tons of weapons-grade anthrax over a 10-month period.
8Id. at 11.
9
Although both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan own parts of Vozrozhdeniye Island, the BW-related infrastructure and testing range is located on the Uzbekistan portion of the island.
"0 Judith Miller, Poison Island: a Special Report; At Bleak Asian Site, Killer Germs Survive, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
1999, at Al. In the spring of 1988, Soviet scientists secretly transferred hundreds of tons of militarized anthrax bacteria in giant steel canisters to Vozrozhdeniye Island, where they were dumped into huge pits and
only partially destroyed.
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U.S. government agencies are actively working to prevent the proliferation of BWrelated expertise in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan through a variety of mechanisms.
For example, the Department of State has direct responsibility for several nonproliferation programs in these countries, helping establish or strengthen export control
systems, providing better nonproliferation tools for export licensing and tracking, and
overseeing U.S. participation in the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
in Russia." The ISTC supports such activities as research projects that provide "incentives for weapons scientists to refrain from cooperating with terrorist groups or states"
and redirects them to "sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent civilian endeavors."12
With numerous countries reportedly seeking former Soviet weapons scientists to further
their own BW programs, 3 these efforts to prevent the proliferation of BW-related expertise enjoy substantial U.S. government support.
The Department of Defense (DoD), through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program, is particularly active in what the DoD refers to as "Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention" (BWPP) projects. These BWPP projects help FSU states dismantle
former Soviet BW research and production facilities; consolidate, secure, and eliminate
pathogenic stocks; and conduct targeted collaborative research with FSU scientists. As
a DoD official stated in testimony before Congress, "in our view, the Biological Weapons
Proliferation Prevention aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional, and increasing,
importance."14
Under the auspices of the ISTC, the DoD is collaborating on research projects at
numerous Russian facilities and is also active in projects that improve the physical
security of dangerous pathogens and biological materials. Additional ISTC projects
designed by the DoD to support BWPP objectives are planned. Besides sponsoring ISTC
projects in Russia, the DoD is working closely with counterpart agencies on BWPP
activities in Kazakhstan under an agreement concerning weapons of mass destruction
infrastructure elimination (WMDIE Agreement).15 These efforts include assistance in
dismantling and demilitarizing BW facilities at Stepnogorsk, enhancing biological safety
and security, and dismantling excess equipment and infrastructure at the Anti-Plague
Institute in Almaty and the Scientific Research Agriculture Institute in Otar. Some of
this assistance is provided under an annex to the WMDIE Agreement that is a framework for assistance related to "biological material protection, control, and accountability to conserve, characterize and protect strain collections of microorganisms and to
prevent the proliferation of biological material that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."1 6
" Testimony of Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Hearing
Before the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act, FEDERALNEWS SERVICE, Nov.
29,2001. The ISTC, which began its work in 1994, is funded by private companies, the European Union, and
the governments of Japan, Norway, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. A similar institution, the
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, began its work in 1995.
12 Id.
3
Judith Miller, The Germ Warriors:A Special Report; Iranians,Bioweapons in Mind,Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, atAl.
" Prepared testimony of Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Hearing Before the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and
Federal Services on the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act, FEDERALNEWS SERVICE, Nov. 29,2001.
" Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of
Energy, Industry, and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning the Elimination of Infrastructure for
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Oct. 3,1995, U.S.-Kaz., as amendedJune 10, 1996, Sept. 9,1998, Dec. 17,1999,
andJuly 29, 2000 (on file with author) [hereinafter WMDIE Agreement]. The WMDIE Agreement implements an "umbrella" agreement, The Agreement Concerning the Destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Response, and the Prevention of Proliferation of NuclearWeapons, Dec.
13, 1993, U.S.-Kaz., 1993 WL 642422, extended Dec. 5,2000 (on file with author). The DoD is the executive
agent for the United States for activities under the umbrella agreement.
6
WMDIE Agreement, supra note 15, at Annex A, Art. I, para. 1 (on file with author).
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It is in Uzbekistan, however, that the DoD has made perhaps the most notable progress since September 11th. After years of analysis and preliminary talks, but within just
weeks of the September terrorist attacks on the United States, the DoD and the Uzbekistan Ministry of Defense signed an agreement to dismantle and demilitarize the BW
infrastructure on Vozrozhdeniye Island and to help Uzbekistan prevent proliferation
of BW technology and dangerous pathogens.' 7 This agreement was viewed as particularly timely in light of the fact that some of the anthrax buried at Vozrozhdeniye was a
highly virulent strain with thick protective capsules resistant to most common antibiotics, qualities that made it an ideal target for theft by terrorists: "Federal officials feared
that al Qaeda terrorists from neighboring Afghanistan might be able to obtain viable
anthrax spores from the soil of the island.., avoiding some of the technical hurdles
involved in developing a weaponized strain of anthrax.""8 Administration officials noted
that this agreement and a number of other U.S. government efforts together "reflect
President Bush's determination to bolster the nation's biological warfare defenses in
the wake of a spate of letters containing anthrax spores."1 Other commentators noted
that although the focus in times of crisis tends to be on havoc and fear, the agreement
with Uzbekistan could be viewed as a "collateral benefit."20 Moving quickly to begin dismantling the BW infrastructure and eliminate pathogens at Vozrozhdeniye, the DoD
is now hoping to expand the BWPP program to Georgia and Ukraine.
Thus, while the United States has been criticized for rejecting the draft BWC protocol, the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax letter attacks in the United
States have focused more attention on other effective measures the U.S. government
is undertaking, including increased bilateral efforts to dismantle the BW legacy of the
former Soviet Union. These accelerated efforts, which include assistance in dismantling
and demilitarizing former production and research facilities, programs to consolidate,
control and secure dangerous pathogens, and collaborative research to prevent the
proliferation of BW-related expertise, are part of a growing, proactive, and targeted
bilateral BW nonproliferation strategy. This proactive bilateral strategy, which is only
part of the U.S. government's efforts in this area, contrasts with the difficulties and frustrations experienced by the United States in its efforts to promote implementation of
effective multilateral measures to counter the threat posed by biological weapons.
7Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States and the Ministry of Defense of the

Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning Cooperation in the Area of Demilitarization of Biological Weapons
Associated Facilities and the Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons Technology, Oct. 22, 2001,

U.S.-Uzb., 2001 UST Lexis 57. This agreement implements the umbrella Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Area of the Promotion of Defense Relations and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass DestructionJune 5,2001, U.S.-Uzb., 2001, 2001 UST Lexis 32. The DoD is the executive agent for the
United States for activities under the umbrella agreement, which was the first agreement signed by Colin
Powell as secretary of state.
"8 Jonathan B. Tucker, How to Regulate The Trade in Toxins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at A23.
in Uzbekistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
"9Judith Miller, A Nation Challenged:Spores; U.S. Agrees to Clean UpAnthrax Site
23, 2001, at B1.
21 Serge Schmemann, A Nation Challenged:An Overview: Oct. 21; More Deaths, More Questions, More Bombs,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at Bi.

